In 1938, Joseph Stalin ordered the purge of the Red Army in a move that shocked both the military and the wider Soviet populace. The purge targeted high-ranking officers and key figures within the Red Army leadership, leading to the execution or imprisonment of thousands of officers. Although it weakened the Red Army, Stalin's motivations for initiating this purge were deeply tied to his broader strategy of consolidating power and maintaining control over the Soviet state.
Stalin’s decision to purge the Red Army in 1938 was primarily influenced by his growing paranoia and fear of potential threats to his rule. By the late 1930s, Stalin had already conducted a series of purges across various parts of Soviet society, including the Communist Party, the intelligentsia, and the secret police. He viewed any potential challenge to his authority as a dangerous and intolerable threat. Stalin became increasingly suspicious of the military leadership, especially as some officers, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, were rumored to have ties to foreign powers or to be involved in conspiracy against him.
The military leadership, many of whom were veterans of the Russian Civil War, had gained significant prestige and power, which threatened Stalin’s absolute control. The purge was, in part, a way to break their influence and ensure that only loyalists to Stalin’s regime remained in positions of power. Tukhachevsky and other senior commanders were accused of treason, espionage, and plotting against Stalin, leading to their arrest, torture, and execution.
Stalin was also terrified of a military coup. He believed that by eliminating potential rivals within the military leadership, he could secure his own position. However, the purge had devastating consequences for the Red Army, leading to a shortage of experienced commanders at a critical time, just before the outbreak of World War II. Despite the short-term damage to military effectiveness, Stalin’s purges ultimately succeeded in strengthening his grip on power, but at the cost of the Soviet Union's military readiness in the early stages of the war.